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INTRODUCTION
On May 27, 2001 , the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), an Al Qaeda affiliate, gained worldwide notoriety when it attacked a popular vacation resort on the Philippine island of Palawan. Thirty tourists were kidnapped for ransom. One of the vacationers, Guillermo Sobero, was an American from Corona, California. Weeks after the kidnapping the ASG announced it had beheaded Sobero. Also abducted was an American missionary couple, Martin and Gracia Burnham of Wichita, Kansas.
3 After a year in captivity in the dense, mountainous jungles of Mindanao, an injured Gracia Burnham was rescued by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Tragically, her husband was killed during the fierce skirmish of the rescue attempt. Since Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) disrupted Al Qaeda's safe haven in Afghanistan, Southeast Asia has become an important sanctuary for the global jihad. The archipelagic nations of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia provide a labyrinth of islands that offers a complex factor of time-space-force, making this region an ideal crossroads for international terrorism. 7 The ASG in the Southern Philippines represents one of the region's firebrand insurgencies and had been linked to Osama bin Laden and his global aims to establish an Islamic caliphate.
David J. Kilcullen, Chief Strategist for Counterterrorism in the U.S. Department of State, asserts that Al Qaeda and its associated movement like the ASG are not a global network of terrorists; rather, these groups have aggregated to become a global insurgency or jihad. 8 In order for regional peace and stability to take root, the United States and its Long War ally, the Philippines, must eliminate more effectively the global linkages and conditions that allow support and refuge for the ASG.
Professors John Waghelstein and Don Chisholm, from the Naval War College, stress the criticality of first properly analyzing an insurgency. This will be a starting point for this analysis. The two authors developed an insurgent taxonomy that is defined through a set of thematic questions that provides the tools to systematically dissect an insurgency. This paper will focus on two of these questions: underlying issues and support of the ASG. 9 Subsequently, delinking, as Kilcullen proposes, severs the ties to the global actors and attacks the root causes that fuel local grievances. 10 Also, it is the delinking of support relationships that will help isolate regional insurgents from the global jihad. To invigorate Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) efforts, action must be taken to delink the underlying issues and ties that give support to the ASG insurgency. Moreover, to successfully quell the Islamic extremists in the Southern Philippines, a more holistic counterinsurgency (COIN) approach must be employed.
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BACKGROUND OF PHILIPPINE INSURGENCIES
The Philippines has been plagued by insurgencies throughout its history. 
UNDERLYING ISSUES
The underlying issues that fuel the ASG, MNLF, and MILF stem from the struggles of Muslims for justice and self-determination. Muslim grievances are ingrained from perceptions of under representation, corruption, and socioeconomic disparities. These underlying issues represent only a portion of the grievances that foster an environment of instability-an ideal situation for insurgents like the ASG. The seams that result because of these three issues are difficult, but not impossible, to repair. Until changes occur, the ASG will continue to assert their legitimacy by mobilizing popular support, both internally and externally.
SUPPORT TO THE ASG
No insurgency can survive long without some degree of popular support. With underlying issues and sources of support placed into context, significant challenges lay ahead in delinking regional and global ties to the ASG. While efforts to date have shown progress, more efficient efforts and resources must be employed to delink and isolate the ASG from the populace and external actors.
DELINKING LOCAL ISSUES FROM THE ASG
Kilcullen contends that a delinking strategy doesn't necessarily require the destruction of the entire the ASG. Instead, Kilcullen would argue that it is a matter of delinking Muslims and ASG's local grievances from the greater global insurgency. 38 This can be achieved in the Philippines through strategies to improve political representation, reduce corruption, improve security, and address socioeconomic problems. A few underlying issues have been identified and must first be addressed in order for COIN efforts to be effective. While it is true that Malacanang Palace needs to reform its government and military structures, an attainable, short-term goal could be improving the socioeconomic plight of the Moros in the South. To promote Sepp's best practices of denying insurgent safe havens, establishing secure areas, and focusing on the people local security must be established. 45 Once security is set, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGO) would have better access to remote areas of the Southern Philippines.
Forty-six percent of the Philippines' population lives on $2 a day or less.
Mindanao is one of the poorest regions and has been home to separatist conflict for years.
NGO's such as USAID have worked with the Philippine government to strengthen the foundation for peace. Sepp's COIN best practice of amnesty and rehabilitation of insurgents would favor social programs and education that give former combatants job skills to help reintegrate them into their communities. 46 At the local level, USAID has helped seven cities in Mindanao and about three dozen municipalities design and carry out good governance and anti-corruption programs.
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DELINKING SUPPORT FROM THE ASG
Kilcullen's re-conceptualization of the Long War in terms of a three-tiered campaign at global, regional and local levels helps define Long War efforts in terms of delinking support. 48 Similarly, Steven Metz and Raymond Millen advocate that the military and other governmental agencies need to develop an effects-based approach designed to fracture, delegitimize, delink, demoralize, and desource the insurgents. 49 To isolate and delink the ASG and gain back local support of the Muslim population, the Philippine government, with U.S. help, must first conduct a robust information operations (IO) campaign. This IO campaign would be the bedrock upon which COIN efforts would rest to establish Kilcullen's three pillars of security, political and economic. 50 The IO effort would counter ASG propaganda, isolate the ASG, and win back the populace's hearts and minds. 51 Waghelstein and Chisholm, however, would raise the question: does the government have the capacity or legitimacy to address these grievances? 52 It is unlikely the Filipino government has the adequate capacity to alleviate the grievances on its own. 54 Moreover, Al Qaeda has evolved in its role and is now the propaganda hub for the global jihad. 55 Delinking efforts such as the U.S. Department of Treasury's action to sever the links of Islamic charities such as the IIRO, needs to be aggressively employed. 56 But more must be done to weed out other sources of ASG financial support and delink these funding chains.
COUNTERPOINT
There are those who would argue delinking the ASG from the global insurgency is neither applicable nor possible in this case. Others would say the ASG is not part of the global jihad, rather, they are a decentralized criminal element that lack the unity of command and effort to reach their stated goals. Some contend that this is another example of "a war of the flea" and that the ASG does not have to win, rather, they just need to avoid losing.
A Philippine-based journalist, Steven Rogers, declared that Washington has a flawed view of the ASG insurgency and has treated this as a case of violent extremists terrorizing the local population. Washington also has emphasized the links to Al Qaeda and JI but has failed to recognize that none of these terrorists created the Moro conflict.
Moreover, the local grievances predate OEF-P by centuries, and neither military might nor money will end the crisis in the Southern Philippines. 57 Due to Philippine constitutional restrictions, the U.S. military has been hamstrung to only advising and training the AFP. Southeast Asian expert, Zachary Abuza argues that while the AFP has taken well to U.S. training, the AFP still lacks the capability and resources to defeat the ASG. He further professes the AFP is short on integrity and the prevalent corruption renders them ineffective in combating the ASG. 64 Jenkins states the goal of terrorism is not to alter the overall military balance of power; therefore, any COIN strategy must address issues that traditionally fall outside of the military dominion. A Philippine government that demonstrates visible and tangible signs of progress in areas such as essential services, governance, and economic opportunity will nullify ASG's reasons for fighting. 65 Kilcullen's strategy of disaggregation or delinking has definite merit in dealing with the ASG. Delinking the local, regional, and Al Qaeda ties will help isolate the ASG.
Nevertheless, as Rogers has poignantly stated, the underlying issues and the Moro insurgency have festered for centuries. Therefore, in order to more effectively delink "the bearer of the sword," the Filipino government, with some U.S. help, must first address the Moro's underlying grievances in the Southern Philippines.
